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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(J) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. While Appellants argue on appeal that the district court erred by granting 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, they have in fact waived this Court's 
consideration of this issue by failing to raise it below, and by acknowledging before the trial 
court that its ruling was correct. This Court will not consider issues not raised below. Lamb 
v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 
359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and cases cited therein; Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
2. The trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees based upon Appellants' breach 
of contract. This Court need not consider this issue because Appellants failed to raise the issue 
below. Lamb. 869 P.2d at 931. Moreover, Appellants have disregarded the trial court's factual 
findings. As a result, they have not marshaled the evidence in support of those findings and 
have not demonstrated that those findings were clearly erroneous. Thus, this Court should 
decline to further consider the issue. State v. Pena. 232 U.A.R. 3, 4 (Utah 1994); Scharf v. 
BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 1985). 
3. Appellee's cross-appeal challenges the trial court's finding that the January 1 
check Mrs. Glazier gave to Appellants was the payment for December 15, 1990 rather than for 
January 15, 1990. This Court need not consider this issue if it rejects Appellants' arguments 
and affirms the trial court's judgment. However, if the Court does reach this issue, it should 
1 
reverse the trial court's finding, as it was clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial 
evidence. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flvnn. 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CITATIONS 
Rules 5 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are attached as Appendices XII and 
XIII to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. The proceeding below was an attempted foreclosure of 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract ("UREC") (Appendix I) between Appellants as sellers and 
defendants, each of whom at one point in time held the buyer's interest in the UREC.1 The 
foreclosure complaint, brought in June 1991, was predicated on two alleged defaults, the first 
allegation being that defendants had failed to provide evidence that the property was insured, and 
the second, that defendants had failed to make timely payments since January 1991. (R. 00002-
00014). Appellee counterclaimed for recovery of the property and for damages suffered as a 
result of Appellants' breach of contract. (R. 00020-00028). 
On April 2, 1991, Appellants sent defendant Byron Wilson a Notice of Default under the 
UREC. (R. 00010, Ex. D19) (Appendix II). No notice of default was given to Appellee 
Westport Funding or to any of the other defendants. Appellee learned of the alleged default in 
mid-May when Appellant Alvan Strasrypka sent to Appellee and to the tenants of the subject 
property a notice to pay rent directly to him (Alvan Strasrypka). (Ex. P10) (Appendix III). 
Then, on June 1, 1991, despite Appellee's protest and prior to the filing of the lawsuit, 
1
 At the time suit was filed, defendant/appellee Westport Funding Company had received through various 
conveyances and assignments all of the remaining defendants' interests in the UREC and the subject property. 
2 
Appellants collected the rents from the property and excluded Appellee from possession without 
legal process. (R. 00732, Ex. Pll). It was only after these actions that Appellants filed the 
lawsuit. (R. 00732). They approached the district court ex parte and in violation of Rule 66(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order appointing Appellant Alvan Strasrypka as receiver 
over the property.2 (R. 00015). They did not advise the district court either (1) that they had 
already taken over the property, or (2) that they knew that Appellee was represented by counsel, 
but had not notified Appellee's counsel of the hearing. The district court granted Appellants' 
ex parte motion and appointed Appellant Alvan Strasrypka as receiver over the subject property. 
(R. 00016-00017). 
On or about January 16, 1992, Appellee brought two motions, one to vacate the order 
appointing Appellant Alvan Strasrypka as receiver, and the other for summary judgment on the 
grounds that there had been no default under the contract. (R. 00044-00058). After full briefing 
and a hearing, the district court summarily set aside the receivership and ordered return of the 
property and all rents collected to Appellee. (R. 00176-00178). The district court left for trial 
only one issue of default, i.e., whether payments had been timely made or tendered during 1991. 
(R. 00174). 
After subsequent discovery, Appellee then brought a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, asking the district court for a summary determination that the only issue of default 
remaining for trial was whether the January and February 1991 payments were timely made. 
2
 Rule 66(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibits a party or other interested person from being appointed 
as receiver without express written consent of all interested parties. 
(b) Appointment of receiver. No party or attorney to the action, nor any person who is 
not entirely impartial and disinterested as to all the parties and the subject matter of the action 
can be appointed receiver therein without the written consent of all interested parties. 
No such consent was sought by appellants or given by appellee or any other defendant. 
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(R. 00280-00281). After full briefing (R. 00281-00302, 00309-00320, 00337-00342), oral 
argument (R. 00514-00543), and a colloquy with counsel (R. 00534-00537), the district court 
granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding that Appellants' counsel was in 
agreement that the only remaining evidentiary issue as to whether the contract was in default was 
whether these two payments had been timely tendered. (R. 00374-00375). 
Following a trial on both the complaint and Appellee's counter-claim, the district court 
ruled in favor of Appellee. (R. 00372-00373). Appellee submitted proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, to which Appellants objected in general without specifying any 
individual finding or conclusion as being objectionable. (R. 00377-00380). After a hearing, the 
district court ordered that a transcript of the trial be made and that both Appellants and Appellee 
submit new proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 00387-00389). This 
process was accomplished, and Appellee moved the district court to enter its proposed version. 
(R. 00401-00418). After full briefing (R. 00419-00436), and a hearing, the district court 
granted Appellee's motion in all respects except one. (R. 00444-00446). Appellee had asked 
the district court to find either (1) that a payment made by defendant Clella Glazier on January 
1, 1991 was for the UREC payment that was due on January 15, 1991, or (2) that Appellants 
had failed to prove that the check was for the December 15, 1990 payment. Instead, the district 
court found that that check was for the payment that was due on December 15, 1990. (R. 
00445) (Appendix IV). It is this finding from which Appellee has filed its cross-appeal. 
The district court then entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix V), 
and its Judgment (Appendix VI). (R. 00447-00459). All of the defendants with the exception 
of Appellee were adjudged to have no interest in the subject real property. (R. 00457-00458). 
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Appellants' complaint against Appellee was dismissed, no cause of action. (R. 00457). Appellee 
was awarded judgment on its counter-claim against Appellees for damages, including $487.98 
for excess funds collected by Appellants during their possession of the real property, for costs 
of $503.50, and for $20,673.25 attorneys fees incurred by Appellee in defending the foreclosure 
and recovering the real property from the receivership. (R. 00458). 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
With the exception of Finding of Fact No. 9, from which the cross-appeal has been filed, 
Appellee adopts in full the trial court's Findings of Fact. Those findings are attached hereto 
as Appendix V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Contrary to Appellants' arguments on appeal, the trial court properly limited the 
issue of default for trial to whether the January 1991 and February 1991 payments had been 
timely made or tendered. Appellants argue that the May 15, 1991 notice constituted effective 
notice of default under the UREC, and that the alleged lateness of the March and April payments 
could have constituted a default sufficient to allow them to foreclose. (Appellants' Brief at 11-
14). Appellants never made this argument to the trial court and are precluded from raising it 
on appeal. Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, Appellants' 
trial counsel acknowledged in oral argument on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that 
the whole crux of the case was the January and February payments. (R. 00531, 00535-00537). 
Having agreed with the trial court at the time of its ruling, Appellants cannot now claim the trial 
court erred. Furthermore, if this Court reaches the merits of this issue, the trial court was 
correct in its ruling. Appellants had rejected a tendered payment prior to their April 2nd Notice 
5 
of Default and refused to accept anything less than the full accelerated balance after that date. 
(R. 00125). Thus, the trial court correctly limited the issue of default for trial to the January 
and February payments. 
2. Disregarding the trial court's factual and legal conclusions, and once again raising 
an issue on appeal that they did not argue below, Appellants deny that they breached the UREC 
by taking over the property by self-help and attempting to foreclose. (Appellants' Brief at 15-
18). Appellants ignore the trial court's findings regarding their actions in taking over the 
property prior to obtaining appointment of a receiver, resulting in Appellants' complete failure 
to marshall evidence in support of those factual findings. Accordingly, this Court need not reach 
this issue on appeal. State v. Pena. 232 U.A.R. 3, 4 (Utah 1994); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 
P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 1985); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 236 
U.A.R. 24, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, should this Court address this issue, there is 
ample evidence to support the finding that Appellants did not have what they claim to be an 
"absolute" right to declare acceleration and regain possession of the property. Appellants 
received both the January and February payments prior to the date they declared acceleration. 
As a matter of law, their receipt of these payments cut off their right to accelerate. Their 
subsequent actions were in derogation of Appellee's rights to continued possession of the 
property and enjoyment of the benefits of the UREC. Because Appellees were the breaching 
parties under the UREC, the trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees against them under that 
contract.3 
3
 Appellants have not disputed that the amount of Appellee's attorneys fees was reasonable given the extent of 
the services rendered and the issues involved. Indeed, Appellants' trial counsel advised the court on the day of trial 
that his own clients' attorneys fees were approximately $15,000.00, which was more than Appellee's attorney's fees 
as of that date. (R. 00764). 
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3. If this Court affirms the district court's judgment, it need not reach Appellee's 
cross-appeal. However, if this Court does address this issue, it should hold that the trial court 
clearly erred in finding that Mrs. Glazier's January 1, 1991 check was tendered for the payment 
due on December 15, 1990. The only evidence in support of that finding was either 
inadmissible or incompetent. Over Appellee's objection, Appellants introduced Mrs. Glazier's 
failure to respond to a Request for Admission as evidence of the purpose of the January 1st 
check. But Mrs. Glazier's failure to respond cannot be used as evidence against Appellee. 
Riberglass. Inc. v. Techni-Glass Industries. Inc.. 811 F.2d 565, 567 (11th Cir. 1987). 
Appellants also offered the testimony of Mr. Strasrypka that his books and records reflected the 
purpose of the January 1st check. Mr. Strasrypka then recanted his testimony and admitted that 
he had no books and records. The only competent evidence regarding the purpose of that check 
supported a finding that it was tendered for the January 15, 1991 payment. Accordingly, the 
trial court clearly erred in finding that the January 1st check was for the December 15, 1990 
payment. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Appellants failed to prove that any payment was late, and thus did not meet their burden of 
proving a default under the UREC. As a result, Appellants never had any right to declare 
acceleration or attempt foreclosure, and their actions in doing so breached the UREC. Thus, 
Appellee was entitled to its attorney's fees as the non-breaching party. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants contend that the trial court should have denied Appellee's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and should have allowed them to introduce evidence at trial going not only 
to the January and February 1991 payments, but also to the March and April 1991 payments. 
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(Appellants' Brief at 11-14). Until this issue is resolved, Appellants argue, the award of 
attorneys fees must be reversed. (Appellants' Brief at 14-15). Appellants finally argue that they 
did not breach the UREC because they had an absolute right under the UREC to declare 
acceleration and foreclose, and that they did not take over the property by self-help. Thus, they 
claim, the award of attorney's fees must be reversed as an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
(Appellants' Brief at 16-19). 
In making their arguments, Appellants raise for the first time issues they did not argue 
below and challenge rulings to which they raised no objection in the trial court. They disregard 
the trial court's factual findings and fail to marshal evidence in support of those findings. Thus, 
Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the trial court's factual findings were clearly 
erroneous. Appellants have thus waived this Court's consideration of the merits of their appeal, 
and the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
I. APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY 
GRANTED, 
A, Appellants Never Argued in the Trial Court the Issue of the March and 
April 1991 Payments that Thev Have Now Raised on Appeal. 
Case law is legion within Utah that appellate courts will not consider an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and cases 
cited therein. Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The purpose of this 
requirement is to put the trial judge on notice of any asserted error, so that the error can be 
corrected at the time of the proceeding. Brown. 856 P.2d at 359. 
Appellants argue that the trial court committed error in granting Appellee's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment because (1) the first notice of default Appellee received was on May 
8 
15, 1991,4 and that therefore, (2) the payments for March and April 1991 were at issue as a 
default predicate under the UREC. (Appellants' Brief at 12-14). Appellants did not make this 
argument at any time during the proceedings below. In fact, Appellants' position below was that 
they were "out of court" if the trial court were to find they had received the January and 
February 1991 payments. (R. 00531). Accordingly, Appellants are prohibited from making this 
argument on appeal in accordance with the principles cited in Lamb v. B & B, supra. State v. 
Brown, supra, and Broberg v. Hess, supra. 
4
 Appellants' notion that the May 15, 1991 notice constituted effective notice of default is preposterous. That 
notice, introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 10 and attached hereto as Appendix III, is more in the nature of an 
eviction notice: 
NOTICE 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Re: Uniform Real Estate Contract, 9-12-75 
Buyer: Byron J. Wilson 
Seller: A.A. Strasrypka and Alvan Strasrypka 
Property: 636-638 West 300 North, SLC, UTAH 
This notice is being sent to you for your information. Your name appeared in a report 
of title as possibly having some interest in and to the property described above and which was 
originally sold by the above referenced Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Payment and corrective action was not received by the sellers and they exercised their 
rights under the contract to accelerate the entire balance due. The title to the property is now 
held in the name of Alvan & Karen B. Strasrypka. 
If you are now a resident on this property you must make all future payments of rent to 
Alvan Strasrypka at 3252 South 525 West, Bountiful, Utah 84010. If payments are not made in 
accordance with this notice, you may be subject to legal action, including eviction. 
Should you have any questions concerning the matter you may contact our office. VTY, 
Donald R. Wilson 
In paragraph 16.C, the UREC between Appellants and Appellee required the notice of default to state that 
the entire unpaid balance was due and payable at once. (See Appendix I). The May 15, 1991 notice does not 
contain this admonition. Nor does this notice allow payment of the accelerated debt before foreclosure commences. 
Instead, it asserts that Appellants had already taken over the property. The document does not follow the 
notification requirements of the UREC's paragraph 16.C. and it is not the notice of default that the UREC 
contemplated. See Weber v. Swenson, 295 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Neb. 1980) (right to accelerate maturity of 
indebtedness, to be effective, should be clear and unequivocal, and ambiguities should be construed to prevent 
acceleration. 
This Notice actually indicates that Appellants believed they had exercised the remedies available under 
paragraph 16.A. of the UREC, i.e., to declare a forfeiture and immediately take possession. But they could 
exercise this remedy without first giving notice and five days to cure. (See Appendix I). 
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B. Appellants Acknowledged in Oral Argument on the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment that Granting the Motion was Appropriate and Proper. 
Appellants argue that Judge Iwasaki erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment that the only payments at issue were those due in January and February 
1991. (Appellants' Brief at 12-14). However, during oral argument on that motion, Appellant's 
trial counsel acknowledged the correctness of such a ruling: 
[MR. WILSON]: Now if the court finds that we didn't accept it [any 
tender of the full contract amount], or we were given the January and February 
payment, we are out of court. Simple as that, [emphasis added] 
(R. 00531) (Appendix VII). 
On further inquiry by Judge Iwasaki in an effort to elucidate Appellants' position, Mr. 
Wilson confirmed that the only issue of default was whether the January and February payments 
had been made: 
THE COURT: You made the statement-I don't want to misunderstand 
you—is it not your position that these two payments, that being January and 
February, constitute the basis for the cause of action that you have, whether or 
not it is in default or not in default? 
MR. WILSON: That is the first basis of default, yes.5 
THE COURT: And your statement was, if I find that those two payments 
were not in default, then you are out of court? 
MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
THE COURT: On the other hand, if I find that in fact they were not 
made, then you win? 
MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
5
 The second basis of default presumably was the alleged failure to provide evidence of insurance. Judge 
Daniels had earlier disposed of this issue on summary judgment, finding that it was undisputed that the subject 
property had been continuously insured at all relevant times, and that appellants had received adequate evidence of 
that insurance within a reasonable time after their request therefor. (R. 00173-74). 
10 
THE COURT: So, with that in mind, I don't see where you and 
[Appellee's counsel] are differing as to positions as to what is necessary for me 
to examine in order to reach either position. And so my point is, that it seems 
to me that the January and February payments are the whole crux of the case. 
MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
(R. 00534-00535) (Appendix VII). 
Appellant's trial counsel and the court continued their dialogue: 
THE COURT: Isn't it clear on your April 2nd notice of default that 
plaintiffs have elected to accelerate the payment and ask for the total amount and 
cost? 
MR. WILSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: And once you have done that, isn't it implicit in your 
election that any other remedy or attempted remedy by the defendants would not 
be accepted? 
MR. WILSON: No. They can remedy that by complying with that 
acceleration. 
THE COURT: Yes, yes, if they paid the whole $9,600 [the balance due 
and owing on the contract at the time of the alleged default]. 
MR. WILSON: Right. Cost and everything. 
THE COURT: I understand that. But anything short of that, it is not 
within that notice of default on April 2nd that they would accept anything else 
other than the total amount of approximately $600 [sic] [$9,600]? 
MR. WILSON: Correct. Now, if the court is willing to rule that that's 
just the issue, those two payments, and that the payments from March. April, and 
May and June are irrelevant, and go not to any amelioration of damage or 
anything else. I would be willing to accept that. It does, however, give an idea 
of what was going on. [emphasis added] 
(R. 00536-00537) (Appendix VII). 
And in his ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Iwasaki noted that 
Appellants' counsel agreed with his assessment of the issues: 
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THE COURT: It is my ruling that the motion and the partial summary 
judgment as to the limitations of the issues regarding whether or not the January 
and February date [checks] were timely or untimely tendered, or were in fact in 
default, will be granted. That's based on my questioning of Mr. Wilson. He 
agrees with mv assessment that if I rule in his favor on the January and February 
payments, then he will prevail in this lawsuit. Conversely if I rule against him, 
then he is out of court. And so I find that the two relevant issues would be the 
timely payments and/or the default of the January and February payments, 
[emphasis added] 
(R.00539) (Appendix VII). 
Having agreed with the trial court's ruling, Appellants cannot now argue that the court 
erred in its ruling. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993). See 
also Barber v. Barber, 349 P.2d 198, 200 (Wyo. 1960) (appellate court will not consider 
contentions which have been waived). 
C. The Trial Court was Correct in Ruling that the Only Issue of Default 
Remaining for Trial was whether the January and February 1991 Payments were Made or 
Timely Tendered, 
Even had Appellants not conceded the issue, the district court did not err in granting 
Appellee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Appellants sued for foreclosure based upon 
their April 2, 1991 Notice of Default. (R. 00004, 118-11, R. 00010-00011) (Appendix II). As 
of that date, the only payments that could have been in default were those for January and 
February 1991,6 which is a fact that Appellants acknowledged in their memorandum opposing 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 00310). In his deposition, Appellant Alvan 
Strasrypka testified that he would have accepted nothing less than the full accelerated amount 
of the UREC after the April 2nd Notice. (R. 00803-00804, 00811). These facts were undisputed. 
The payment under the UREC was due on the 15th of each month and was not considered to be in default 
until 30 days later. (Appendix I) Appellants only sued based on the January 1991 payments forward. (R. 00010-
00011). As of April 2, 1991, only the January and February payments could have been in default, for the March 
1991 payment would not have been in default until April 15th. 
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These undisputed facts support the district court's conclusions that the only issue of 
default remaining for trial was whether the January and February 1991 payments were made or 
timely tendered. In Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Washington, 161 P.2d 355 (Utah 1945), this 
Court acknowledged the axiom that the law does not require the performance of a futile act. Id. 
at 358. Appellants admitted repeatedly on the record that a tender after April 2d of anything 
but the full amount owed on the UREC would have been futile. (R. 00803-00804, 00811). 
Indeed, just days prior to sending out their April 2nd Notice of Default, Appellants had actually 
rejected a payment that had been tendered, and returned it to Appellee's title company. (R. 
00309-00310, Iff 2 and 3; R. 00592; Ex. P-9)(Appendix XIII).7 The April 2nd Notice of 
Default mailed to Appellee's predecessor in interest in the UREC itself was an open 
manifestation of Appellants' intent to refuse anything but a full payout. And Appellants' position 
was further evidenced by Appellants' counsel's June 6, 1991 letter to Appellee's counsel, 
rejecting a (second) tender of the March and April payments,8 as well as those due for May and 
June. Therein, counsel stated, "Any attempts to cure the default after the notice are ineffectual 
and have not been accomplished as of this date." [emphasis added]. (R. 00125, Ex. P12) 
(Appendix IX). With such clear and undisputed manifestation of their intent to reject any tender 
of monthly payments, the trial court correctly ruled that any tender after April 2, 1991 would 
have been futile. 
7
 The payment that was returned to the title company had been sent to appellants by the title company in 
response to appellants' complaint that the January 1991 UREC payment had not been made. (Finding of Fact Nos. 
12, 13, and 16). 
8
 Despite appellants' claims to the contrary, the payments for March and April were tendered in mid-April, 
1991. (R. 00642-644; Ex. D-14). 
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Having failed to make their arguments to the trial court, and indeed, having agreed with 
the trial court's ruling on the partial summary judgment, Appellants are in no position to argue 
on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the motion. The trial court's ruling on the Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment was correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLANTS WERE 
IN BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THAT APPELLEE WAS 
ACCORDINGLY ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A. Although Thev Made Substantial Objections to Appellee's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellants Never Objected to the Trial Court's 
Ruling that their Acts Constituted a Breach of Contract. 
As explained above, an issue that was not raised in the trial court may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Although Appellants made a general, blanket objection to all of Appellee's 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, they never argued that the trial court would 
err if it found their wrongful actions to be a breach of contract. (R. 00379-00380). Appellants' 
blanket objection was based on their contention that Appellee's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were not in conformity with the trial court's bench ruling. (R. 00379-
00380).9 Extensive proceedings followed that objection, taking almost six months to resolve. 
(R. 00377-00446). After this considerable review, the trial court eventually entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In none of the proceedings did Appellants argue that proposed 
9
 Appellee argued to Judge Iwasaki that he was not bound by his bench ruling and could alter that ruling if 
the evidence so justified. (R. 00419-00429) Ultimately Judge Iwasaki changed his bench ruling in part and entered 
most of Appellee's proposed findings and conclusions. (R. 00444-00445). Appellants' citation to the trial court's 
bench ruling notwithstanding, the court's recital of its findings and conclusions from the bench is not a final order. 
Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919, 921-22 (1943), and the final order may differ 
from the court's initial conclusions. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 562 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
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Conclusion of Law No. 9 was in error. Having failed to object, Appellants are precluded from 
raising the issue at this late date. 
B. Appellants have Disregarded the Trial Court's Factual Findings that thev 
Took Over the Subject Property by Self-Help and Have Not Marshaled the Evidence 
Supporting those Findings. 
In protesting the district court's ruling that they had breached the contract, Appellants 
have presented a mixed question of law and fact, i.e., did the trial court properly rule that 
Appellants' actions after receiving the January and February 1991 payments constitute a breach 
of contract. (Appellants' Brief at 15-19). While Appellants have not identified any specific 
Finding of Fact with which they take issue, they have argued that the evidence does not support 
the district court's "presupposition" that Appellants took over the property by self-help. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 18). Appellants have ignored Finding of Fact No. 21, in which the district 
court found that Appellants took over the property without Appellee's consent, and before Mr. 
Strasrypka was appointed as receiver. This Finding of Fact is the factual predicate for 
Conclusion of Law No. 8, that the self-help was a breach of contract. The district court's entry 
of this factual finding may be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. Kasco Services Corp. v. 
Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992). Because they overlooked the factual finding, Appellants 
did not marshal any evidence supporting the finding, and have thus waived this Court's 
consideration of the issue. State v. Pena. 232 U.A.R. 3, 4 (Utah 1994); Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 
700 P.2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 1985). The question of law Appellants raise is whether their 
wrongful actions of declaring acceleration, prematurely taking over the property, and attempting 
to foreclose the UREC, were a breach of the contract. This question is reviewed for 
correctness. Kasco v. Benson, 831 P.2d at 89. 
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1. The Trial Court Specifically Found that Appellants Took Over the 
Property By Self-Help. 
Appellants argue, without marshaling any evidence that supports the trial court's ruling 
or demonstrating the ruling to be clearly erroneous, that they employed appropriate legal means 
to obtain possession of the property and thus were not in breach. (Appellants' Brief p. 18). 
Appellants have ignored Finding of Fact No. 21, which supports the trial court's conclusion that 
Appellants breached the contract by employing self-help measures. That finding is as follows: 
FINDING OF FACT 21. Sometime during May 1991, [Appellants] sent the 
tenants of the property notice that they had taken over and that all future rents were to 
be made to [Appellants]. (Ex. D19). Thereafter, and without the consent of [Appellee], 
[Appellants] collected June 1991 rents from the tenants. (Tr. p. 170; Ex. Pll). 
(Appendix V). The actions described in this Finding of Fact took place before Appellants filed 
the complaint and obtained appointment of the receiver (Ex. Pl l , R. 00070). Those actions 
constitute the basis for the trial court's ruling that Appellants took over the property by self-help. 
In challenging this factual finding, Appellants must undertake the heavy burden of 
marshaling "'...in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" Oneida/SLIC v. 
Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 236 U.A.R. 24, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). By ignoring 
this Finding of Fact and failing to marshal the evidence that supports it, Appellants have failed 
to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous, and have waived this Court's consideration 
of the issue. Id.; State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Broberg v. Hess. 782 
P.2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
However, even if this Court decides to address this issue, there was ample evidence to 
support the trial court's finding. For example, in the May 15, 1991 Notice (Exhibit D-19) 
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(Appendix III) that Appellants sent to all tenants of the property and to Appellee, Appellants 
asserted that they had taken possession of the property and, under threat of eviction, demanded 
that all future rents be paid to them. The trial court also considered Exhibit P-ll, Appellee's 
counsel's June 4, 1991 letter to Appellant's counsel, confirming that Appellants had collected 
rents from the real property for the month of June 1991. (Appendix X). At R. 00731-00732, 
Appellant Alvan Strasrypka testified that he collected rent from the tenants on June 1, 1991 and 
again on June 3, 1991. The accounting that Mr. Strasrypka submitted to the district court at R. 
00181-00195, and introduced at trial as Defendant's Exhibit 18, was for the period June 1, 1991 
forward. The complaint was not filed until days later, on June 7, 1991. (R. 00002). The 
district court did not appoint Mr. Strasrypka as receiver over the property until June 11, 1991. 
(R. 00016-00017). Thus, the trial court's finding that Appellants took over the property by self-
help has ample support in the record, is correct, and should be left intact by this Court. 
Oneida/SLIC. 236 U.A.R. at 25. 
2. Appellants' Actions in Taking Possession of the Property, 
Excluding Appellee from All Possessory Rights, and Attempting 
to Foreclose Even Though Thev Were Not Entitled to Accelerate, 
Were a Breach of Contract. 
Appellants argue that once a payment had not been made under the UREC within the 30 
day default period, they had an "absolute" right to declare acceleration and obtain possession of 
the property. (Appellants' Brief p. 16). However, this is not an accurate statement of the law, 
the facts or the contract that governed the parties' relationship. 
In granting judgment in favor of Appellee on Appellants' breach of contract, the district 
court concluded: 
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4. A valid tender of all amounts due under the contract was made to the 
plaintiffs before April 2, 1991. 
5. The valid tender of the payments cut off the plaintiffs' right to declare 
acceleration. (Home Owner Loan Corporation v. Washington. 161 P.2d 355 
(Utah 1945)). 
While these legal conclusions are reviewable for correctness, the district court accurately 
reflected the law in its ruling. In the Home Owner case, which Judge Iwasaki referenced in his 
conclusion, this Court stated: 
The law relative to tender under contracts, which provides that in the case of 
default the holder has the option to declare the whole amount due, is well set 
forth in 52 Am.Jur.245, § 41, which is as follows: "Under a contract which 
provides that any default in the payment of the interest or an instalment [sic] of 
the principal when due shall give the obligee an option to declare the whole 
amount due, the general rule is that a tender of payment of the overdue principal 
or interest before the option to declare the whole debt due has been exercised cuts 
off the right to exercise the option, [citations omitted]. This is so because the 
debt does not become due on the mere default in payment, but by affirmative 
action by which the creditor makes it known to the debtor that he intends to 
declare the whole debt due." [emphasis added]. 
Home Owner Loan Corporation v. Washington. 161 P.2d 355, 358 (Utah 1945). See also 
Romero v. Schmidt. 392 P.2d 37, 38 (Utah 1964) (valid tender of all existing delinquencies 
prevents foreclosure of real estate contract as a note and mortgage). 
In the instant case, the only issue of default was whether the January and February 1991 
payments had been made prior to the April 2nd acceleration. The district court found that 
Appellants had received both of those payments, and that both of those payments had been 
tendered prior to the April 2, 1991 Notice of Default. (Findings of Fact Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 
15, 16, and 17) (Appendix V). Having received the payments prior to declaring the 
acceleration, Appellants lost their contractual right to declare acceleration. Home Owner, 161 
P.2d at 358. 
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Appellants' actions after receiving the January and February 1991 payments were in 
derogation of Appellee's rights under the UREC. The UREC was in full force after Appellants' 
receipt of the payments. Thus, they were contractually prohibited from exercising any of the 
default remedies set forth in paragraph 16 of the UREC. Those remedies, which are available 
only in the alternative,10 are as follows: 
16. A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the 
default within five days after written notice, to be released from all obligations 
in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have been 
made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as 
liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees 
that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take possession of said premises 
without legal process as in its first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions 
and improvements shall remain with the land and become the property of the 
Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
16.B. [Allows Seller to bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent 
installments] OL. 
16.C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written 
notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance hereunder at once due 
and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same 
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and have the property sold and 
the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, including costs and 
attorneys fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may 
remain. In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a 
complaint, shall be immediately entitled to the appointment of a receiver to take 
possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and profits 
therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold 
the same pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment 
of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of the said premises during the 
period of redemption. 
Exhibit P-l [emphasis added] (Appendix I). 
10
 This particular paragraph in the Utah Uniform Real Estate Contract has been interpreted by this Court as 
being in the alternative. Van Zvverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1964). 
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Though they were not entitled to declare acceleration because they had already received 
the January and February payments, Appellants attempted to exercise, not one, but both 
Paragraph 16.A. and 16.C. remedies. First, they sent the April 2nd Notice of Default, 
attempting to accelerate the balance due, presumably under Paragraph 16.C. of the UREC. 
(Appendix I). They then sent the May 15, 1991 notice to all tenants, insisting that title to the 
property was now in their name and demanding that all future rents be paid to them. (Appendix 
III). This declaration was not preceded by any notice, but is apparently based on paragraph 
16.A.'s forfeiture provision. This May 15th notice is in direct contravention of Appellants' 
initial declaration of acceleration based on paragraph 16.C. Appellants collected rents from the 
real property on June 1st and again on June 3rd, apparently in reliance on paragraph 16.A. 
They filed the complaint a week later and obtained appointment of a receiver, apparently in 
reliance on paragraph 16.C. 
Nothing in the UREC justified any of these actions. Paragraph 3 of the UREC gave 
Appellee (its predecessors) possession of the property as of September 15, 1975. Appellants 
could only regain possession pursuant to Paragraph 16. Having opted on April 3rd to accelerate 
the balance due pursuant to Paragraph 16.C. (though not entitled to do so), Appellants never sent 
any Paragraph 16.A. notification to remedy the default. Thus, Appellants had no right to 
declare a forfeiture on May 15th and to retake possession.11 Once Appellants declared their 
option to accelerate under paragraph 16.C. (though wrongfully), they were contractually 
prohibited from taking possession of the property prior to filing a complaint and obtaining 
11
 Forfeiture provisions that allow a seller the option to retake possession without legal process are not self-
executing. The seller must first give notice of exercise of the option to forfeit. Fuhriman v. Bissegger, 13 Utah 
2d 379, 375 P.2d 27 (Utah 1962). 
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appointment of a receiver. Appellants' right to accelerate having terminated prior to their April 
2nd Notice of Default, the foreclosure complaint itself was a complete repudiation of the UREC, 
and was a breach of Appellee's rights to enjoy the benefits of the contract. See e.g. Western 
Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah 1993) (breach of contract occurs when one 
intentionally attempts to destroy or injure other party's right to receive fruits of contract); 
Cobabe v. Stanger. 844 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1992) (party's refusal to perform under terms of 
an agreement constitutes breach); Bean v. Hallett. 240 P.2d 931, 932 (Wash. 1952) (total breach 
of contract committed by vendors when they repossessed property before complying with terms 
of real estate sales contract regarding forfeiture). 
Appellants never complained to the trial court that their actions did not constitute a 
breach of contract, and thus they have waived this issue on appeal. Their disregard of the trial 
court's factual findings regarding their breach of contract and their failure to marshal the 
evidence supporting those factual findings also preclude this Court from finding any error below. 
The trial court's factual findings regarding Appellants' actions are not clearly erroneous, and its 
legal conclusion that those actions constitute a breach of contract is correct. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
III. THE UREC ITSELF WAS NEVER IN DEFAULT, AND THUS 
APPELLANTS NEVER HAD ANY RIGHT TO EXERCISE THEIR OPTION 
TO ACCELERATE. 
Appellee has cross-appealed the issue of whether Appellants proved at trial that the 
UREC had ever been in default. Appellee raises this argument in an abundance of caution, and 
it need not be considered if this Court rejects Appellants' arguments and affirms the trial court's 
rulings and judgment as outlined above. 
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As proponents of the allegation that they were entitled to accelerate, Appellants had the 
burden at trial of proving that the UREC was in default. See Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d 
345, 347 (Utah 1980) (when parties have entered into a formal contract, such as for the purchase 
of real property, the one claiming a forfeiture of the contract has the burden of showing 
justification for doing so.) Central to Appellants' burden was proving that the January 1 check 
Mrs. Glazier had tendered was for the December 15, 1990 payment. If instead, as Appellee 
contended at trial (R. 00572), the check was for the January 15, 1991 contract payment, then 
Appellants received, not one, but two payments for January 1991, the first from Mrs. Glazier 
on January 1st and the second from the title company on February 27, 1991. (Findings of Fact 
Nos. 12 and 13). Having failed to prove that the UREC had ever been in default, Appellants' 
actions in accelerating, retaking the property, and attempting to foreclose were a breach of 
contract. 
No competent evidence was introduced to prove that the January 1st check was for the 
December payment. The district court thus erred in entering Finding of Fact No. 9: 
9. The January 1, 1991 check was for the payment that was due on 
December 15, 1990. 
After all evidence introduced at trial in support of this finding is marshaled, it is clear that the 
finding lacks support, is clearly erroneous, and should be reversed. Cove View Excavating & 
Const, v. Flvnn. 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
A. Mrs, Glazier's Failure to Respond to Appellants9 Request for Admissions 
Cannot be used Against Appellee. 
At trial, and over Appellee's objection, Appellants introduced Mrs. Glazier's failure to 
respond to Appellants' Request for Admissions as evidence of the alleged fact that the check she 
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had tendered to Appellants on January 1, 1991 was for the December 15, 1990 payment rather 
than for the January 15, 1991 payment. (R. 00723-00729). This ruling was improper. Mrs. 
Glazier had denied any interest in the property, as evidenced by her answer filed in the case 
(R. 00029). On February 19, 1992, Mrs. Glazier signed an affidavit under oath, stating that the 
January 1, 1991 check was for the payment due on January 15, 1991. (R. 00133-00137). It 
was not until after Appellee filed that affidavit with the court that Appellants served Mrs. Glazier 
with a Request for Admission, asking her to admit that the check had been tendered, not for 
January 1991 but for December 1990. (R. 00723). Contrary to Rule 5, Utah R.Civ.P.,12 
Appellants did not serve Appellee with notice that it had served the Request for Admission on 
Mrs. Glazier. Mrs. Glazier, a pro se litigant who had denied any interest in the property and 
in the litigation, did not respond to the request. Mrs. Glazier died approximately two months 
prior to trial. Appellee was unaware until the day of trial that the Request for Admission had 
been served upon Mrs. Glazier. 
Appellants had already rested their case (R. 00639) when they asked the court to admit 
Mrs. Glazier's non-response to the Request for Admission (R. 00723). Over Appellee's 
objection, the court allowed the non-response to be admitted as evidence of Mrs. Glazier's 
understanding of the purpose of the check. (R. 00726-00727). This ruling was incorrect, not 
only because Appellants had already rested their case,13 but because the effect of the court's 
ruling was to use Mrs. Glazier's omission to prove a fact adverse to Appellee. 
12
 Rule 5 requires that "every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party unless the court 
otherwise orders. . . shall be served upon each of the parties. . . . " [emphasis added] 
13
 Cf. Massev v. Haupt, 632 P.2d 824 (Utah 1981) (admissions obtained under the rule must be offered into 
evidence as a part of a litigant's case, prior to proffer of jury instructions). 
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InRiberglass. Inc. v. Techni-Glass Industries. Inc., 811 F.2d. 565 (11th Cir. 1987), the 
trial court had granted summary judgment against several defendants based upon their failure 
to respond to various requests for admissions. Because of this ruling, the court then granted 
summary judgment against another defendant, despite the fact that this defendant had denied the 
same requests in a timely and legally sufficient manner. The appellate court reversed the trial 
court, finding that the deemed admissions of co-defendants could not bind or be used in any 
fashion against the responding defendant. Id. at 567. 
In a similar case, In re Leonetti. 28 B.R. 1003 (D.D.C. 1983), the court affirmed the 
lower court's refusal to admit into evidence the admission of one party against a co-defendant: 
[A] response to a request for admission is more in the nature of a pleading than 
it is testimony. See McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F.Supp. 628 (E.D. Pa., affd, 
356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966)). As Judge Freedman observed in McSparran. 
An answer to a request under Rule 36 is unlike a statement of fact 
by a witness made in the course of oral evidence at trial, or in oral 
pre-trial depositions or even in written answers to interrogatories 
. . . The purpose of the Rule is not the discovery of information, 
but the elimination at trial of the need to prove factual matters 
which the adversary cannot fairly contest. 
225 F.Supp. at 637. Professors Wright and Miller, who cited McSparran with 
approval, have noted that: 
Admissions obtained under Rule 36 may be offered in evidence at 
the trial of the action, but they are subject to all of the pertinent 
objections to admissibility that may be interposed at the trial . . . 
It is only when the admission is offered against the party who 
made it that it comes within the exception to the hearsay rule for 
admissions of a party opponent. 
C. Wright and A. Miller, 8 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2264, at 741 (1970) 
(footnotes omitted). 
In re Leonetti. 28 B.R. at 1009 [emphasis added]. 
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In Hungerford v. Greate Bay Casino Corp.. 517 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1986), a pro se litigant 
had denied a specific fact. Counsel for the opposing party then sent a request for admission 
regarding the same fact, to which the pro se litigant failed to respond. At trial, the court denied 
counsel's effort to introduce the non-response as an established fact. The court found that the 
only possible purpose of the request for admission, "was the hope [the pro se litigant] would not 
answer and that his failure to answer could be used to seek judgment against him." Id. at 504. 
The court denounced this tactical maneuver, finding it to be a patently improper use of the 
request for admissions. 
The purpose of requests for admissions is to streamline litigation by "weeding out items 
of fact and proof over which there is no dispute, but which are often difficult and expen-
sive to establish by competent evidence, and thereby expedite the trial, diminish its costs, 
and focus the attention of the parties upon the matters in genuine controversy." Requests 
for admission should not be used as a tactical device to trap unwary pro se litigants. 
Id. (citations omitted) [emphasis added]. 
Based on these cases, Mrs. Glazier's non-response to the Request for Admission should 
not have been used by the trial court in any fashion. The "admission" is contrary to Mrs. 
Glazier's own affidavit, which had been filed with the court prior to the Request for Admission. 
It was obtained from an unwary pro se defendant with no interest in the property or the 
litigation. It constitutes inadmissable hearsay as to all parties who were at the trial. And 
finally, Appellants should not have been allowed to introduce any pleading into evidence that 
was not served on Appellee, in violation of Rule 5, Utah R.Civ.P. Accordingly, this 
inadmissible evidence cannot support the trial court's factual finding. 
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B. The Court Should Have Disregarded Appellant Alvan Strasrypka's 
Testimony as to His Personal Knowledge and as to What His Books and Records Reflected 
Because He Admitted on Cross-Examination that He Did Not Have Any Personal Knowl-
edge and He Did Not Have Any Books and Records. 
Appellants also offered the testimony of Appellant Alvan Strasrypka in support of their 
contention that the January 1 check was for the December 1990 payment. Mr. Strasrypka's 
testimony was purportedly based upon his personal knowledge of the contents of the UREC (R. 
00580) and on information contained in his books and records. (R. 00584-00585). However, 
Mr. Strasrypka subsequently admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge 
of whether or not Mrs. Glazier's payments over the years had been made late or early, and that 
he had no books and records on which to base his conclusion that the January 1 check was a late 
payment for December 15th rather than an early payment for January 15th: 
Q. [By Ms. Van Frank]: You weren't there when the property was sold 
[by Mr. Strasrypka's father to Mrs. Glazier]; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And so your only source of getting information about whether or not 
she [Mrs. Glazier] was late or early or otherwise in her payments was your 
father, right? 
A. That's correct. 
* * * 
Q. (By Ms. Van Frank) The basis of your personal knowledge as to 
whether or not she [Mrs. Glazier] was early or late [in her monthly payments], 
is your records, that's what you testified to earlier; isn't that correct? 
A. [Mr. Strasrypka]: Yes. 
(R. 00601-00602) (Appendix XI). Turning to Mr. Strasrypka's deposition, Appellee's counsel 
then asked: 
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Q. On page 2 on page 32~excuse me. At line 2 on page 32 I have asked 
you the question, "Have you found any bank records of your own to reconstruct 
payment dates from Mrs. Glazier" and your response was, no, you hadn't found 
any payments or any records of your own. And then I asked you if you found 
any bank records of your father's, and your answer was, no, these checks were 
cashed immediately. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have no records - you have no records. You have only the 
checks that you recall receiving on the first of the month for more than ten years; 
isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 00603) (Appendix XI). Appellant Karen Strasrypka also testified that plaintiffs had no books 
and records on which to base their contention that Mrs. Glazier was late rather than early. (R. 
00638) (Appendix XI). Nor did the elder Mr. Strasrypka keep any books and records of 
payments that Mrs. Glazier made. (R. 00603, 00638). In fact, Appellants' testified that their 
only evidence in support of their theory that the January 1, 1991 payment was late was their 
recollection that for more than ten (10) years they had received a check on the first of the month 
rather than the 15th. (R. 00631, 00638) (Appendix XI). But a check on the first of the month 
could just as easily be inferred as an early payment. This evidence does not meet Appellants' 
burden of proof.14 
The only other evidence in support of Finding of Fact No. 9 was Mr. Strasrypka's testimony that Mrs. 
Glazier had told him that she made the payment late each month because she did not receive the rent until the first 
of the month. (R. 00629). This evidence was admitted over appellee's hearsay objection. The trial judge allowed 
the testimony to satisfy his own curiosity, acknowledging that he could disregard it if he so chose. (R. 00628). 
In a bench trial, it is presumed that the court only considered admissible evidence in entering its findings. State in 
Interest ofR.D.S., 777 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court also had before it and in the record 
Mrs. Glazier's affidavit that she signed before her death. Contrary to Mr. Strasrypka's testimony, Mrs. Glazier 
herself had stated that she had never made a single late payment over the entire ten year period she held her interest 
in the property, and that the January 1st check was for the payment due on January 15th, not December 15th. 
(00133-00147). 
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C. The Only Competent Evidence as to the Purpose of the January 1st Check 
Is Contrary to the Trial Court's Finding of Fact No. 9, 
The independent testimony given at trial and documentary evidence submitted by 
Appellants themselves indicates that by the end of January 1991, Appellants had already received 
the January 15th payment. Thus, the January 1, 1991 check had to have been tendered for the 
January 15th payment. 
Michele Wallace, escrow officer for the title company that closed the transaction 
between Appellee and Mrs. Glazier, testified that she called Appellant Alvan Strasrypka in the 
latter part of January or the first part of February, 1991 to obtain the balance owing on the 
UREC. (R. 00688). She testified that in that conversation, Appellant Alvan Strasrypka told her 
that he had received the January 1st payment, that the February payment would soon be due, 
and that the payoff amount on the UREC as of the date of their conversation was $9,652.53. 
(R. 00688). Mr. Strasrypka also told Ms. Wallace that the payoff amount after application of 
the February installment would be $9,621.88. (R. 00688). Ms. Wallace wrote down these 
numbers in order to use them in the closing. Exhibit D24, (R. 00688). 
Apparently Mr. Strasrypka obtained those numbers that he quoted to Ms. Wallace from 
the amortization schedule for the UREC. Appellants introduced that schedule as Exhibit P2. 
Page 7 of the schedule indicates that after payment of the January 1991 installment, the balance 
due on the UREC was $9,652.53, the exact payoff figure that Mr. Strasrypka gave Ms. Wallace 
as of the end of January. The schedule also indicates that after payment of the February 1991 
installment, which the title company would be collecting at closing, the balance due on the 
UREC was $9,621.88, the same payoff amount that Mr. Strasrypka gave to Ms. Wallace. Had 
Mr. Strasrypka not believed the January 1st payment was the one due on January 15th, he would 
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not have given the title company these figures. Thus, Ms. Wallace's testimony and the amorti-
zation schedule are the only competent evidence that was introduced as to the purpose of the 
January 1st check. That evidence does not support the trial court's finding that Mrs. Glazier's 
January 1st check was the December 1990 payment. 
D. There Was No Substantial Competent Evidence to Support the Trial 
Court's Finding of Fact No. 9 and It Must be Rejected. 
When there is inadequate or incompetent evidence supporting a trial court's factual 
finding, it is clearly erroneous and must be set aside. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. 
Flvnn. 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The only evidence supporting Finding of Fact 
No. 9 was (1) inadmissable hearsay resulting from defendant Clella Glazier's failure to respond 
to requests for admission, which hearsay cannot be used against Appellee; (2) Appellant Alvan 
Strasrypka's testimony based on personal knowledge and his books and records, neither of which 
he possessed, as he later admitted on cross-examination; (3) Appellants' testimony that for more 
than ten (10) years they had received a check on the first of the month rather than the 15th, 
which evidence is inconclusive, for Mrs. Glazier could just as easily have been paying her bills 
consistently early rather than consistently late; and (4) Appellants' testimony that Mrs. Glazier 
told them she could not pay the contract payment any earlier because she collected the rents on 
the first of the month, which is inadmissible hearsay. Appellants thus did not meet their burden 
of proving that the UREC was in default, and the trial court's factual finding based on this 
evidence was clearly erroneous. 
Having failed to prove that the January 1st check was for the December payment, 
Appellants never proved that they were entitled to declare acceleration and foreclose the UREC. 
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Accordingly, their actions in contravention of Appellee's rights were a breach of contract and 
Appellee was entitled to recover its attorney's fees as damages therefor. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have waived this Court's consideration of their appeal by failing to raise these 
issues below. They have disregarded the trial court's factual findings, have not marshaled the 
evidence in support of those findings, and their appeal should be rejected for these reasons 
alone. The trial court properly granted Appellee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and 
properly awarded Appellee its attorney's fees under the UREC. The trial court's rulings should 
be affirmed. 
If this Court must reach the issue of the cross-appeal, it should find that there was no 
substantial evidence in support of the trial court's finding that the January 1, 1991 check Mrs. 
Glazier gave to Appellants was the payment for December 15, 1990 rather than for January 15, 
1991, and that the trial court clearly erred in making that finding. This Court should vacate that 
finding of fact, and then affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Appellee on the grounds 
that Appellants failed to prove that they were entitled to the contractual remedies of acceleration 
and foreclosure, and that they therefore breached the contract by attempting to interfere with 
Appellee's contractual rights. 
Appellee should also be awarded its attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this _H^ day of July, 1994. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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"Thi« it a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice.". 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate thtt l i l h d»y ef September . .., A. D„ 19—ZS-, 
by end between A. A, StRASRYPKA, . « widower .
 a n d ALVAN STRASRYPKA. h t . • on. as <olnt tan 
hereinafter d«.ign.ted
 U th. Seller, and __WKgf . .J > WILSON G r ^ » 
hereafter data-tad
 M the Buyer, of. . S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
2.. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to : * buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, cuate in 
the county of S a l t Lake . _ .,
 s u l u o t Utah, to-wit: - 6.36-038 West 300 North, S I S , JJtah Aooncai 
More particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner o£ Lot 2, Block 73, Plat nCfl, Salt Lake C'.ty Survey 
and running thence East 53.5 feet; thence North 90 feet; thence West 53,5 f < ' ; thenci 
South 90 feet to the point of BEGINNING• 
SUBJECT to bright of way over the East 5 feet thereof and together with * r*U;ht of 
way 5 feet wide adjoining on the East of said tract. ALSO subject to a ripht of way 
over the West \ rods thereof. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ^ ND NO/100 n^]tr. (t 14.500.00 \ 
payable at the office of Seller, hi* assigns or order aft d i r e c t e d by s e l ^ X 
atrictly within the following Urn**, U,wit;0NE THOUSAND £1VK HUNDRED AND N0/100- — ( | 1 ,500 .00 } 
ca*h, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ lrLi Q.Qfi »I-Q shall be paid as follows: 
$95,00 each month commencing October 15, 1975, and monthly thereafter on the 15th day 
of each month% until the unpaid principal balance together with interest is paid in 
full. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the ?A-.h day of September
 f 19 7 5 , 
4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from September 15 , J.875 on all unpaid portions ef the 
purchase price at the rat* of —§ifi*LC-. .. per cent ( . 2 %) per annum. Tho Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, *uch excoaH to be applied cither to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election muttt be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
15. It is understood and agreed that if th« Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to tho terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
-£$2!: . . . . . .. with an unpaid balance of 
. — ., as of — _ _ _ _ _ _ .. ., 
7. Seller represents thut there arc no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
arty, except the following .. none _ , 
8. The Seller is given the option tn secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed ?*uvl£ percent 
( %) per annum and puyablu in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans aha 11 not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amuuot of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller Agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of thin agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by M«ller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligationa are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agree* to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on theso premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against aald premises except the following: 
none . 
Utah Title and Abstract Company 
Salt Lake 3557533 looel* 882.3511 Sevier 896-6418 Summit 336-5679 Zenith 864 • " ^-3373 
rne oeiter iurinir covenants »nu agrees inat uv win nv* u«*«u 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after . 
Se£cember 15} 1975 
IS. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable building* and improvement! on said promises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ . 
and to assign laid insurance to thy Stiller as his interests ra,ay' appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in' the payment nf any special or K«n«ral tuxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums no advanced 
and naid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rat« of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to b« committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that h« will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payment) when the same shall become due, or within ^^1-T^y (pQ) 
Seller, at his: option shall have the following alternative rerntfdias: 
days thereafter, the 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be rwleaaed from all obligations in law and in equity to convey naiii property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall he forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Bayer agrees Lhat the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of aaid premisCH without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions mad« by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the S«ll*r, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Sollcr may bring suit, and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
feei. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. Tho Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at one* due and payable, and may ulect to treat this contract as a not* and mortage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
tho State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fens; and thu Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the CBSQ of foreclosure, thu Seller hereunder, upon ihv filing of a complaint, shall be Immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the posAession 
of the aaid premises during the period of redemption. 
l l It is agreed that time is the essence of this agrwemuiit. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred tn, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other thun herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and recciva credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforcaaid, 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to he paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances «xe«pt ah herein mentioned and except s i may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Kuycr, and to furnish aL his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It i* hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties h«reto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
tnita present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the partios hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto „ - n o n e * 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in) that the defaulting party shall pay nil costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining po*e«ssion of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by th« statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, admlnt .t-ators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signod their names, the *<y and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
I£^O^L 




APPENDIX I I 
LAW O F F I C E S 
W I L S O N 6C W I L S O N 
: W.LC R.WILSON 8620 HIGHLAND DRIVE TELEPHONE R R R - O ' ^ 
nv \ E.VILSON SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84121 ART:A CCI 
April 2, 1991 
CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT NO. P 715 946 890 
Mr. Byron J. Wilson 
717 W. Madison 
Springfield, Missouri 65806 
Re: Uniform Real Estate Contract, 9-12-75 
Buyer: Byron J. Wilson 
Seller: A, A. Strasrypka and Alvan Strasrypka 
Dear Mr. Wilson: 
Our client, Mr. Alvan Strasrypka, has retained our services 
in connection with the Uniform Real Estate Contract which you 
signed for the purchase of property at 636-638 W. 300 North, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. All payments on this contract have not 
been made and those that have been made have not been made within 
the time limits specified by that contract. Further, the Seller 
has not been furnished with evidence of insurance assigned to 
them as required by Paragraph 13 of that contract. It also 
appears that you may have sold your interest in this contract 
without the agreement of the Seller and that the property may 
have been resold several additional times. 
While you may have sold your interest in this property to 
other individuals, your original agreement is still enforceable 
between the Seller and yourself, and the Seller must look to you 
for any redress. I direct your attention to Paragraph 16, on the 
back page of that agreement, as to the Seller's remedies, and in 
accordance therewith, I have been directed to give you the 
following notice: 
NOTICE 
You are hereby given notice that you are in default in the 
performance of that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated 
9-12-75 by and between A. A. Strasrypka, a widower, and Alvan 
Strasrypka, his son, as joint tenants, as Seller, and Byron J. 
Wilson, as Buyer, concerning the sale of certain real property 
known as 636-638 West 300 North, Salt Lake City, Utah, more 
particularly described as: 
EXHIBIT £ , 00010 
Mr. Byron J. Wilson 
April 2f 1991 
Page Two 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 
73, Plat MCMf Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
thence East 53.5 feet; thence North 90 feet; thence 
West 53.5 feet; thence South 90 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
SUBJECT to a right of way over the East 5 feet thereof 
and together with a right of way 5 feet adjoining on 
the East of said tract. 
ALSO subject to a right of way over the West 1/2 rod 
thereof, 
for failure to make payments in accordance with the agreement, 
and to provide insurance on the property properly assigned to the 
Seller. 
The Seller has elected to declare the entire unpaid balance 
under the contract at once due and payable and they may elect to 
treat this contract as a note and mortgage and pass the title to 
the Buyer, subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose 
the same in accordance with the law of the State of Utah and the 
provisions of the contract, including taking immediate possession 
and the appointment of a receiver. 
Payment is to be made by cash, cashier's check, or certified 
funds made payable to Alvan Strasrypka, and sent to this office. 
If you have any questions as to the amounts or procedures please 
contact my office. Failure to comply with this Notice will 
result in the Sellers exercising their rights under the contract. 
Dated this 2nd day of April, 1991. 
FOR^iVAN STRASRYPKA: Si BY: JU> g ^ y ^ 
Donald R. Wilson, Attorney at Law 
OOOli 
APPENDIX III 
X>OJ*Ai,I> B -V1LSON 
I H E N E E.WILSON 
LAW O F F I C E S 
WILSON 6t W I L S O N 
0 d 2 0 HIGHLAND PSIVE 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , UTAH 8 4 1 2 1 
TELEPHONE err~os<«a 
AHEA CODE 6 0 1 
May 15 , 1991 
CERTIFIED MAIL-RETURN RECEIPT NO. 
NOTICE 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Re: Uniform Real Estate Contract, 9-12-75 
Buyer: Byron J* Wilson 
Seller: A. A* Strasrypka and Alvan Strasrypka 
Property: 63^-638 West 300 North, SLC, UTAH 
This Notice is being sent to you for your information. 
Your name appeared in a report of title as possibly having 
some interest in and to the property described above and 
which was originally sold by the above referenced Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. 
Payment and corrective action was not received by the 
sellers and they exercised their rights under the contract 
to accelerate the entire balance due. The title to the 
property is now held in the name of Alvan & Karen B. 
Strasrypka. 
If you are now a resident on this property you must 
make all future payments of rent to Alvan Strasrypka at 3252 
South 525 West, Bountiful, Utah 84010. If payments are not 
made in accordance with this notice, you may be subject to 
legal action, including eviction. 
Should you have any questions concerning the matter you 
may contact our office. 
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Id R. Wilson 
£fa SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 when additional aervices are desired, and complete items 
v 3 m d 4. 
Put your address in the "RETURN TO" Space on the reverse side. Fellure to do this will prevent this 
cerd from being returned to you. The return receipt fee will provide you the name of the person delrvered 
to end the date of delivery hor additional fees trie following services ere available. Consult postmaster 
for fees and check box(es) for additional service(s) requested 
1 D Show to whom delivered date, end addressee's address 2. • Restricted Delivery 
(Extra charge) (Extra charge) 
3 Article Addressed to 
Clella F. Glazier 
' 1840 Osage Orange Ave. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
<£JU£4* si MJ?* 
^ 
£*L* 
4 Article Number 
715 946 894 
Type of Service. 
I Registered Insured 
0 5 Certified D COD 
D Express Mail D ?0?^ergh%CnTs€ 
Always obtain signature of eddresste 
or agent and DATE DELIVERED. 
5. Signature — Address 
X 
^ 8 . Addressee's Address (ONLY if 
requested and fee paid) 




7 . Dete of Delivery 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , Mar. 1988 * U.$ GUP.O, 1 9 8 8 - 2 1 2 - 8 6 5 DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT 
© SENDER: Complete items 1 tr L 2 when additional ser/ices aro daslrod, and complete rtems 3 and 4 
Put your address h the "RETURN 1 0 ' Space on the reverse side Feiiure to do th,s will prevent this 
card from being returned to you The return receipt fee will provide you the name o< the person delivered 
to and the date of delivery For additional tees the following services are available Consult postmaster 
for fees and check box(es) for additional service(s) reqjested 
1 D Show to whom delivered, date and addressee s address 2 D Restricted Delivery 
(Ex*ra chargs) (Ex'ra charge) 
3. Article Addressed to 
CFG Investment Co. 
1840 Osage Orange Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Signature — Address (} / . V 
< h 
Article Number 
P 715 946 895 
Type of Service 
D Registered 
D Certified 
D Express Mail 
• Insured 
D COD 




 for Merchandise Always obtain signature of addressee 
Of agent and DATE DELIVERED 
Addressee's Address (ONLY if 
requested and fee paid) 
6. Signature — Agent 
X 
7. Date of Delivery 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , Max. 1988 • US.G.P .O. 1 9 8 8 - 2 1 2 - 8 6 5 DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT 
A SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 when additional services are desired, end complete items 
^ 3 and 4. 
Put your address \n the "RETURN TO" Space on the reverse side. Failure to do this will prevent this 
card from being returned to you. The return receipt fee will provide ycu the name of the person delivered 
to and the date of delivery. For additional fees the following services are available. Consult postmaster 
tor fees and check box(es) for additional service(s) requested. 
1. D Show to whom delivered, date, and addressee's address. 2. Q Restricted Delivery 
(Extra charge) (Extra charge) 
3. Article Addressed to: 
. Equities Management Co, 
P.O. Box 3642 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
5. Signature — Address 
x
 / 7 4f/% 
4. Article Number 
P 715 946 896 
Type of Service: 
U Registered Insured 
J9 Certified • COD 
ill '.Express Mail [*"] Return Receipt L
-
J
 for Merchandise 
Always obtain signature of addressee 
or agent and DATE DELIVERED. 
8. Addressee's Address (ONLY if 
requested and fee paid) 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , Mar. 1988 * U.S.G.P.O. 1 9 8 6 - 2 1 2 - 8 6 5 DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT 
A SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 when additional services are desired, and complete items 
V 3 and 4. 
Put your address in the "RETURN TO" Space on the reverse side. Failure to do this will prevent this 
card from being returned to you. The return receipt fee will provide you the name of the person delivered 
to and the date of delivery, hor additional fees the following services are available. Consult postmaster 
for fees and check box(es) for additional service(s) requested. 
1. O Show to whom delivered, date, and addressee's address. 2. U Restricted Delivery 
(Extra charge) (Extra charge) 
3. Article Addressed to: 
WESTPORT FUNDING 
P.O. Box 3642 
SLC, UT 84110-3642 
Signature — Address 
6. Signature — Agent 
X 
7. Date of Delivery 
4 . Article Number 
P 715 946 897 
Type of Service: 
Q Registered LJ Insured 
E Certified D COD 
D Express Mail D ^B^SSX 
Always obtain signature of addressee 
or agent and DATE DELIVERED. 
8. Addressee's Address (ONLY if 
requested and fee paid) 
Ytr.\ mm 
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Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Westport Funding Company 
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BYRON J. WILSON, CLELLA F. 
GLAZIER, CFG INVESTMENT CO., 
WESTPORT FUNDING CO., and 
JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH FIVE, 
O R D E R 
Civil NO. 91-0903626-PR 
Judge Glen S. Iwasaki 
Defendant Westport's Motion to Enter its Amended Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law came on for hearing before the Honorable Glen S. Iwasaki on 
Thursday, October 28, 1993, Leslie Van Frank, of and for COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 
appearing on behalf of defendant Westport Funding Company, and Donald L. Wilson of 
WILSON & WILSON, appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, the Court having reviewed the 
f l H / U 
pleadings of record, having heard the argument of counsel, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Westport Funding's motion is granted 
with the exception of proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 and Conclusion of Law No. 4. The Court 
rejects these paragraphs and stands on its previous ruling with respect to the January 1, 1991 
check. Accordingly, Conclusion of Law No. 4 shall be deleted and Finding of Fact No. 9 shall 
read as follows: 
59. The January 1, 1991 check was for the payment that was due 
on December 15, 1990. 
Within five (5) days of the date hereof, defendant Westport Funding shall submit 
to the Court for its signing and entry the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which 
shall incorporate the changes set-forth herein. 
DATED this/4/c lay of November, 1993. 
BY THE CQgftT: 
THE HONORABLE GfcEN SrIWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
sent by United States mail, postage fully prepaid, on this t^Tday of November, 1993, to the 
following: 
Donald R. Wilson 
WILSON & WILSON 
5620 Highland Drive 
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COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
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P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Westport Funding Company 
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BYRON J. WILSON, CLELLA F. ) 
GLAZIER, CFG INVESTMENT CO., ] 
WESTPORT FUNDING CO., and ] 
JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH FIVE, ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
I AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 91-0903626-PR 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
the 16th day of March, 1993 before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, 
Judge, presiding, and sitting without jury. The plaintiffs were 
present and represented by Donald L. Wilson of WILSON & WILSON, 
Attorneys. The defendant Westport Funding Company was present by 
the presence of Duane Cutler, and represented by Leslie Van Frank 
of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. The defendant Byron J. Wilson 
was present but was not represented by counsel. No other defen-
ds e't present or represented. 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 5 1393 
/ SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
The present parties, through their respective counsels, 
stipulated that the defendants Byron J. Wilson, Clella F. Glazier 
(deceased), C.F.G. Investment Co., and the remaining unnamed 
defendants, had no further interest in and to the property or in 
the proceedings and the cause of action against those individuals 
was dismissed. 
The Court, by way of prior partial summary judgments, 
ruled that the contract in question was not in default by virtue of 
non-payment of or failure to provide for hazard insurance upon the 
premises or for any lack of loss payee assignment, and that the 
only issue of any alleged default remaining for trial by this Court 
was whether or not the January and February 1991 payments due under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract that is the subject of this case 
were made or timely tendered. The Court, therefore, proceeded to 
hear the testimony of witnesses, accept and review exhibits pro-
ferred by the parties7 counsels, heard arguments and proffers by 
counsel, and having been fully advised of the premises therein, the 
Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Alvan Strasrypka and Karen B. Strasrypka, the plain-
tiffs herein, are the record title owners of the real property that 
is the subject of this lawsuit, more particularly described as: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 73, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 
2 
U 0 4 4 J 
53.5 feet; thence North 90 feet; thence West 53.5 feet; 
thence South 90 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO A RIGHT OF WAY over the East 5 feet thereof, 
and together with a right of way 5 feet wide adjoining on 
the East side of said tract. 
ALSO subject to a right of way over the West 1/2 rod 
thereof. 
2. The plaintiffs' interest in the property is subject 
to a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated September 12, 1975, by and 
between A.A. Strasrypka and plaintiff Alvan Strasrypka as sellers 
and Byron J. Wilson as buyer (hereafter "Contract"). (Ex. PI) 
3. Defendant Westport Funding Company is the assignee 
of the buyer's interest in the Contract, having obtained its 
interest in February 1991. (Tr. p. 79) 
4. Westport Funding purchased its interest from C.F.G. 
Investment Company as part of a package of properties, the total 
sales price of which was in the $200,000.00 range. (Tr. pps. 121-
22) . 
5. The Contract provides for a thirty (3 0) day grace 
period for payments. (Ex. PI) 
6. Clella Glazier regularly mailed her payments to 
Alvan Strasrypka from the time Mr. Strasrypka's father died in 1980 
for more than ten years. (Tr. p. 45). 
f|f»da~i 
7. Alvan Strasrypka accepted all such payments from 
Clella Glazier without objection to the method of delivery, i.e., 
mailing. (Tr. p. 45). 
8. On or about January 1, 1991, Clella Glazier tendered 
a $95.00 check to Alvan Strasrypka, which check Mr. Strasypka 
accepted and cashed. (Tr. p. 21) . 
9. The January 1, 1991 check was for the payment that 
was due on December 15, 1990. 
10. On February 14 or 15, 1991, Western States Title 
Company mailed a check dated February 14, 1991 in the amount of 
$95.00 to Alvan Strasrypka. (Page 2 of Ex. D22; Tr. Ill, 118). 
11. Alvan Strasrypka received the February 14 check from 
Western States Title. (Tr. pp. 112-13, 129). 
12. After receiving the February 14 check, Mr. Stras-
rypka called the title company and complained that he was also owed 
the January payment. (Tr. pp. 112, 129). 
13. In response to Mr. Strasrypka's complaint, the title 
company prepared another check, dated February 26, 1991 in the 
amount of $95.00 payable to Alvan Strasrypka, and mailed it to him 
on that day or on February 27, 1991. (Ex. P4; Tr. pp. 113). The 
funds for this check had come from the closing of another of the 
properties that Westport Funding was purchasing from C.F.G. 
Investment. (Tr. p. 114). 
4 
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14. Western States Title Company had sufficient funds in 
its trust account to pay the February 14 and February 26 checks. 
(Tr. p. 115). 
15. Several days after the February 26th check was 
mailed, Alvan Strasrypka again called the title company. This time 
he asserted that Mrs. Glazier could not assign the contract, and he 
wanted to be paid in full. (Tr. pp. 131-32). 
16. On March 28, 1991, plaintiffs7 attorney mailed the 
February 26 check back to the title company. (Tr. p. 31; Ex. P9) 
17. Plaintiffs then asserted that there was a default 
under the contract, asserted an acceleration of the contract, and 
on April 2, 1991, mailed a Notice of Default to Byron Wilson. (Tr. 
pp. 27-28; Ex. P7). 
18. At all times from and after April 2, 1991, the 
plaintiffs have refused tender of any payment except the full 
amount claimed as due under the terms of the contract. (R. 
[Motion for Partial Summary Judgment]). 
19. Prior to trial, a payment for each month from 
January 1991 to the date of trial had been tendered into court, and 
at the time of trial were being held by the clerk of the court 
pending further court order. (R. ) . 
20. Prior to the opening of evidence at trial, defendant 
Westport's counsel proffered tender of all payments, from January 
\\ 0 
1991 to the date of trial, which tender plaintiffs refused. (Tr. 
pp. 9-10). 
21. Sometime during May 1991, plaintiffs sent the 
tenants of the property notice that they had taken over and that 
all future rents were to be made to plaintiffs. (Ex. D19) . 
Thereafter, and without the consent of Westport, plaintiffs 
collected June 1991 rents from the tenants. (Tr. p. 170; Ex. Pll) . 
22. Although plaintiffs were aware that defendant 
Westport was represented by counsel, they approached the court ex 
parte and obtained an order appointing plaintiff Alvan Strasrypka 
as receiver of the property. (Exs. Pll, P12, P13; R. ) . The 
plaintiffs did not tell the court that that they had already taken 
over the property by self-help, nor that they had failed to give 
notice to defendant Westport or its counsel of their motion to 
appoint Mr. Strasrypka as receiver. (R. ). 
23. After being appointed as receiver, Alvan Strasrypka 
continued to collect the rents, and from those rents paid himself 
$12.00 per hour for such tasks as mowing the lawn. (Ex. D18) 
24. During his tenure as receiver, Alvan Strasrypka 
failed to pay the water bill for almost six months (Tr. pp. 173, 
180-81; Ex. D18). 
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25. By its order dated April 13, 1992, this court 
vacated its previous order appointing Mr. Strasrypka as receiver. 
(R. ) • 
26. From the $4,260.00 Alvan Strasrypka collected as 
rents from the property, he kept $1,270.76 before remitting the 
remainder to Westport on April 7, 1992. (Ex. D18) 
27. The funds Mr. Strasrypka kept were expended as 
follows: 
a. $317.14 was paid to utilities and $355.74 was 
paid for property taxes, for a total of $682.88. (Ex. D18) 
b. The remaining $587.98 was disbursed to Alvan 
Strasrypka himself for parts, tools, mileage, and labor at the rate 
of $12.00 per hour. (Ex. D18) 
28. Had Westport Funding been in possession of the 
property during Alvan Strasrypka's receivership, its out-of-pocket 
expenditures would have included the $682.88 for utilities and 
taxes, and $108.00 for maintenance and repairs. (Tr. pp. 182-83). 
29. Westport would not have expended the extra $487.98 
that Mr. Strasypka paid himself as receiver. (Tr. p. 182-86) . 
30. Westport had $20,000.00 equity in the property at 
the time the lawsuit was filed. (Tr. p. 189) 
31. The principal balance of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract after payment of the January 15, 1993 payment was in 
riH/l^'^ 
e x c e s s of $ 9 , 6 0 0 . 0 0 . (Ex. P2 ; R. [Motion f o r P a r t i a l Summary 
J u d g m e n t ] ) . 
32. Despite plaintiffs' attempted acceleration, Westport 
Funding did not have the ability to pay the principal balance. (Tr. 
p. 87) . 
33. As of March 15, 1993, Westport Funding has incurred 
$14,221.50 in attorneys fees and $503.50 in recoverable costs in 
defending this action and in protecting its interest in the real 
property. The billing rates explained in the Affidavit of Leslie 
Van Frank are reasonable and within the market range of fees 
charged by other attorneys and paralegals in Utah with comparable 
qualifications and experience. The services indicated in the 
affidavit were reasonably and necessarily undertaken to defend 
against the plaintiffs' action and to recover the property from the 
plaintiffs' receivership. The sum of $14,221.50 is a fair and 
reasonable attorneys fee in this matter as of March 15, 1993. 
34. Defendant Westport Funding is also entitled to its 
attorneys fees in the amount of $2,502.50, as established by 
Supplemental Affidavit of Leslie Van Frank, for the trial of this 
matter and the preparation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and to such additional attorneys fees incurred for post-
trial proceedings to the time of entry of judgment, as shall be 
nnA^/1 
established by affidavit. These fees were also reasonably and 
necessarily incurred in the defense of this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Westport Funding Company is the assignee of the 
buyer's interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
September 12, 1975. 
2. Under the terms of the contract, if the payments 
were made more than 30 days after they were due, plaintiffs were 
entitled to declare an acceleration of the principal amount due, 
elect to treat the contract as a note and mortgage, and to 
foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
3. Plaintiffs declared acceleration on April 2, 1991. 
4. A valid tender of all amounts due under the contract 
was made to the plaintiffs before April 2, 1991. 
5. The valid tender of the payments cut off the plain-
tiffs' right to declare acceleration. (Homeowner Loan Corporation 
v. Washington, 161 P.2d 355, (Utah 1945). 
6. The plaintiffs' declaration of acceleration and 
attempted foreclosure of the contract is a breach of that contract. 
7. The contract was not in default for non-payment on 
April 2, 1991 or at any time thereafter. 
9 
8. Plaintiffs wrongfully took over the property by 
self-help and in violation of Rule 66, U.R.Civ.P. 
9. Plaintiffs7 actions in wrongfully taking over the 
property constitute a breach of the contract between the parties. 
10. Plaintiffs' actions in taking over the property by 
self-help constitutes unclean hands. 
11. Foreclosure is an equitable proceeding. 
12. Equity prevents plaintiffs from foreclosing. 
DATED this/y^^ay of November, 1993. 
BY TI 
jlenn K.Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
.'i n Ar^r, 
APPENDIX VI 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 s \m 
Leslie Van Frank (Bar No. 4913) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Westport Funding Company 
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BYRON J. WILSON, CLELLA F. 
GLAZIER, CFG INVESTMENT CO., 
WESTPORT FUNDING CO., and 
JOHN DOES ONE THROUGH FIVE, 
J U D G M E N T 
C i v i l No. 91-0903626-PR 
Judge Glenn$£ Iwasaki 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on the 15th day of November, 1993 regarding the 
trial of this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's cause of action against defendant 
Westport Funding Company is hereby dismissed, no cause of action. 
2. Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against defendants 
Bvron J. Wilson, Clella F. Glazier and C.F.G. Investm^^t Company 
declaring that those defendants have no interest in the following 
real property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 73, 
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 
53.5 feet; thence North 90 feet; thence West 53.5 feet; 
thence South 90 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO A RIGHT OF WAY over the East 5 feet thereof, 
and together with a right of way 5 feet wide adjoining on 
the East side of said tract. 
ALSO subject to a right of way over the West 1/2 rod 
thereof. 
3. The Uniform Real Estate Contract dated September 12, 
1975, by and between A.A. Strasrypka and plaintiff Alvan Strasrypka 
as sellers and Byron J. Wilson as buyer, in which defendant 
Westport Funding Company now owns the buyer's interest, is hereby 
declared to be in full force and effect. 
4. Defendant Westport is awarded judgment against 
plaintiffs, jointly and severally, as follows: 
a. $487.98 damages. 
b. $20,673.25 attorneys fees. 
c. $503.50 costs, 
for a total judgment of $21,664.73. 
5. The clerk of the court is hereby ordered to release 
to plaintiffs all the funds currently held in trust, less $487.98, 
which the clerk of the court is hereby ordered to release to 




APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
WILSON Sc WILSON 
Donald Wilson 
Attorneys for plaintiffs 
day of November, 1993 
BY THE^COUR^: 
Km. Glenn^ Iwasaki 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was sent via First Class mail on the 1 b day of 
November, 1993 to the following: 
Donald R. Wilson 
WILSON & WILSON 
5620 Highland Drive 





























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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BYRON J. WILSON, CLELLA F. 
GLAZIER, CFG INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, WESTPORT FUNDING 
COMPANY, and JOHN DOES ONE 
THROUGH FIVE, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 910903626 PR 
* * * * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
MARCH 10, 1993 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
m 1 6 1993 
—QALJ/tAKE COUNTY 
NORA S. WORTHEN, CSR, RPR 
(801) 535-5040 00514 
1 no knowledge whatsoever that this would not be paid and 
2 that's just as counsel has indicated. She is, in essence, 
3 arguing our own law and the law of this case* 
4 The case law—and incidentally this is not the 
5 most recent nor the best case—but I've cited in my 
6 memorandum Williston, among other things, the proposition 
7 that this knowledge must be communicated. It must be in 
8 the terms of the cases manifested to the obligor that the 
9 obligee will not perform. And that is the situation in 
10 this case. 
11 The only thing that they alleged is the 
12 deposition in December of '92 in which our client said 
13 after April 2nd, after they had made their election, after 
14 they had declared a default, then they did not have to go 
15 any further. The only way—and this case, incidentally, 
16 holds for what I'm about to say—the only way they can cure 
17 that defect is to bring up the entire contract. 
18 Now if the court finds that we didn't accept it, 
19 or we were given the January and February payment, we are 
20 out of court. Simple as that. But neither the statute nor 
21 any of the law requires us to go in and say to the opposing 
22 parties, okay, on this date, 15th of every month, another 
23 default. We go down and record that at the recorder's 
24 office. That is not required by the law or the statute. 
25 What is even more to the point in this particular 
18 
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1 in any way. We agreed to do this to try to resolve the 
2 matter. What I am saying, however, it would put us in a 
3 somewhat dis—changed position, if that's the only matter 
4 that is going to be before the court, that is the January 
5 and February payment. The other facts are already before 
6 the court. There are some disputes and I would submit it 
7 on that basis. 
8 THE COURT: Let me ask a few questions, 
9 Mr. Wilson. 
10 MR. WILSON: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: You made the statement—I don't want 
12 to misunderstand you—is it not your position that the two 
13 payments, that being January and February, constitute the 
14 basis for the cause of action that you have, whether or not 
15 it is in default or not in default? 
16 MR. WILSON: That is the first basis of default, 
17 yes. 
18 THE COURT: And your statement was, if I find 
19 that those two payments were not in default, then you are 
20 out of court? 
21 MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
22 THE COURT: On the other hand, if I find that in 
23 fact they were not made, then you win? 
24 MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
25 THE COURT: So, with that in mind, I don't see 
21 
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1 where you and Ms. Van Frank are differing as to positions 
2 as to what is necessary for me to examine in order to reach 
3 either position. And so my point is, that it seems to me 
4 in the January and February payments are the whole crux of 
5 the case. 
6 MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
7 THE COURT: And it seems there is no dispute that 
8 the other payments, March, April, May, June, et cetera, to 
9 the date of court had not been made, they were tendered and 
10 rejected, but that is really irrelevant as to whether or 
11 not this default, or alleged default, give rise to the 
12 foreclosure? 
13 MR. WILSON: That is correct. 
14 THE COURT: Okay? So with that in mind, not that 
15 the issues are not—well, with that in mind, it would 
16 appear to me also, based upon what you've said, that it is 
17 not your position they have to tender each and every month, 
18 and to be rejected each and every month to preserve their 
19 claim, that it really is irrelevant as to the examination 
20 of whether or not payments were made in March on? 
21 MR. WILSON: I would agree to exactly what you've 
22 said so far. 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MR. WILSON: The one problem is that in order to 
25 cure they must bring up each and every payment until the 
22 
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1 time of—well, at the time they proffered that tender, 
2 which is June. 
3 THE COURT: Unless it is excused by a futile act. 
4 MR. WILSON: Yes. It is excused by a futile act. 
5 THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Haven't you 
6 made it plain in your April 2nd notice of default that you 
7 have elected or plaintiff has elected to accept only the 
8 accelerated amount of approximately $9,600, and that is 
9 your election and so any other remedy that the defendant 
10 may seek would have no effect, and that is further 
11 substantiated and this is after the fact, but by the 
12 depositions of your clients a year and a half later that 
13 indicates I would not have accepted anything after April 
14 2nd? 
15 MR. WILSON: Now, I'm not quite following your 
16 argument. 
17 THE COURT: It is not my argument. I am just 
18 asking for clarification. 
19 MR. WILSON: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Isn't it clear on your April 2nd 
21 notice of default that plaintiffs have elected to 
22 accelerate the payment and ask for the total amount and 
23 cost? 
24 MR. WILSON: Correct. 
25 THE COURT: And once you have done that, isn't it 
23 
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1 implicit in your election that any other remedy or 
2 attempted remedy by the defendants would not be accepted? 
3 MR. WILSON: No. They can remedy that by 
4 complying with that acceleration. 
5 THE COURT: Yes, yes, if they paid the whole 
6 $9,600. 
7 MR. WILSON: Right. Cost and everything. 
8 THE COURT: I understand that. But anything 
9 short of that, it is not within that notice of default on 
10 April 2nd that they would accept anything else other than 
11 the total amount of approximately $600? 
12 MR. WILSON: Correct. Now, if the court is 
13 willing to rule that that's just the issue, those two 
14 payments, and that the payments from March, April, and May 
15 and June are irrelevant, and go not to any amelioration of 
16 damage or anything else, I would be willing to accept that. 
17 It does, however, give an idea of what was going on. And 
18 what was really going on in this particular instance is 
19 that Mrs. Glazier sold the contract to another party. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I don't want to get into the 
21 facts of that part because that will remain to be an issue 
22 of fact. So I am not going against Judge Daniels' prior 
23 ruling. I find that there is an issue of fact, a dispute 
24 of fact, and dispute of law as to January and February. So 
25 all evidence necessary to prove either respective position 
24 
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1 concerned, it is not relevant whether or not those payments 
2 were timely tendered. 
3 I believe with that in mind, and with counsel's 
4 representations that he would agree with the courts 
5 recommendations here, we will submit it. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Van Frank. 
7 And I appreciate both counsel engaging in the 
8 colloquy with the court. 
9 It is my ruling that the motion and the partial 
10 summary judgment as to the limitations of the issues 
11 regarding whether or not the January and February date were 
12 timely or untimely tendered, or were in fact in default, 
13 will be granted. That's based upon my questioning of Mr. 
14 Wilson. He agrees with my assessment that if I rule in his 
15 favor on January and February payments, then he will 
16 prevail in this lawsuit. Conversely if I rule against him, 
17 then he is out of court. And so I find that the two 
18 relevant issues would be the timely payments and/or the 
19 default of the January and February payments. 
20 MS. VAN FRANK: Your Honor, could I just clarify 
21 for the record: Counsel has indicated that he believes 
22 that if the court finds the payment were not timely made, 
23 then he wins. I don't think that that is fully the issues 
24 that are before the court I think there is an equitable 




DONALD H. WILSON 
IRENE E. WILSON 
LAW O F F I C E S 
W I L S O N & W I L S O N 
5 6 2 0 HIGHLAND DRIVE 
S A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 2 1 - 1 3 0 3 
TELEPHONE 2 7 7 - 0 1 4 3 
AHEA CODE 8 0 1 
March 28, 1991 
Western States Title Company 
Sugarhouse Trust Account 
2120 S. 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
mi I PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
Re: Our client Alvan Strasrypka 
Your File No. 88020 
Gentlemen: 
Your check No. 24606, dated February 26, 1991, 
is returned herewith pursuant to our recent telephone 
conversation. 
Very truly yours, 




LAW O F F I C E S 
WILSON & WILSON 
5 6 2 0 HIGHLAND D R I V E T ^ T P P H n v * . - o r * r»i_Ln 
DONALD R . W I L S O N T E L E P H O N t 2 7 4 . - 0 1 - 1 3 
IRENE E .VCILSON S A L T L A K E C I T Y , UTAH 8 4 1 2 1 AREA CODE 801 
June 6, 1991 
Leslie Van Frank, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Re: Strasrypka et ux vs. Wilson et al 
Dear Ms. Van Frank: 
Your letter of June 4, was received and I would like to take 
this opportunity to correct some of the information which you 
stated therein. 
In our telephone conversation of May 30, I agreed to send 
you a copy of the Notice of Default which was sent to Byron J. 
Wilson along with additional information which you requested. I 
told you that some of this information you requested was not in 
my file and that I would obtain that as quickly as possible and 
get back with you on Monday, June 3. 
When I phoned you on Monday, June 3, I informed you that 
part of my file was misplaced but that I had not received the 
information from our clients clarifying the payments actually 
missing. I stated that I had asked our clients to forward that 
information to me. 
Shortly after your letter was received I received from our 
client the information I needed to answer your inquiries. 
Approximately an hour and half after your letter was received our 
client called and informed me that he had been contacted by a 
person asking as to whether he had received checks from Western 
States Title. He informed her that he had not received the 
checks from Western States Title and she was referred to our 
office. I did not receive a call from that individual. 
In our conversations I indicated to you that cur client was 
willing to accept full payment of the contract as accelerated, 
including the costs incurred to that date, without going to any 
foreclosure expense. You indicated you were unable to accept 
that offer until you had conferred with your client and received 
Leslie Van Frank 
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the Notice. I also requested that you furnish copies of any 
leases or rent agreements on the property and you indicated you 
thought that there may be some but you did not have that 
available. I also suggested that we agree that the rents which 
were sent to the Strasrypkas be held by them in a special account 
rather than going to the necessity of filing a complaint and 
getting a court appointed receiver. You said you were unable to 
agree or consent to that offer. 
After conferring with our client I find that the payments 
for January to the present time have not been made or were not 
made in a timely fashion prior to the Notice sent to Byron J. 
Wilson. Also, no evidence of insurance with the assignment of 
the policy to the Strasrypkas has been received. 
You reported in your letter that the title company disbursed 
the February 1991 payment directly to Mr. Strasrypka. This is in 
error as the Strasrypkas did not have any knowledge of this 
closing, did not appear at the closing, nor were they represented 
by any person at the closing. They did not learn of the closing 
until some time later. They have not been a party to any other 
assignments or this contract and have not accepted any such 
assignments. 
In your letter you forwarded payments for the months of 
March, April, May and June, 1991. This still leaves a deficiency 
for the months of January and February, 1991 and the insurance 
with the loss payee clause assigned to our client. You reported 
that this would be obtained and forwarded to us within a week. 
It is our clients position that the contract was in 
default, they elected to accelerate the payment, did so, gave 
notice, and the default was not cured. Any attempts to cure the 
default after the notice are ineffectual and have not been 
accomplished as of this date. 
As I indicated in our prior conversations the Strasrypkas 
were willing to accept full payment of the balance on the 
contract which is less than $10,000.00, plus their costs incurred 
to date. They remain willing to comply fully with the contract 
and this offer but they are unwilling to accept less than the 
payments that were due and their costs and to reinstate the 
contract. I am, therefore, returning the two checks which you 
forwarded since thev do nor clear the default. 
Leslie Van Frank 
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As I indicated in our prior conversations and I reiterate 
again, we are not interested in getting into litigation but we 
are not interested in taking less than the amount to which are 
clients are entitled. Thank you for your cooperation in this 
matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Donald R. Wilson 
Ends. 
cc: Mr. & Mrs. Strasrypka 
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HAND-DELIVERED 
Donald R. Wilson, Esq. 
WILSON & WILSON 
5620 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Re: Equities Management Co. and Westport Funding Co. v. 
A. A. Strasrypka and Al Strasrypka 
Dear Mr. Wilson: 
As you know, this office represents Equities Management 
Co. and Westport Funding Co. with respect the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract dated 9/12/75, the sellers of whom are the Strasrypkas 
mentioned above. You have explained that A. A. Strasrypka is 
deceased and Al Strasrypka now owns the real property in joint 
tenancy with his wife. I have explained to you that Westport 
Funding Company is the assignee of Byron J. Wilson, the original 
Buyer in the contract. Equities Management is the property 
management company. 
To confirm our telephone conversation of May 30, 1991, 
you advised me that Mr. Strasrypka has sent a notice of default to 
Byron J. Wilson. I asked you for a copy of that notice, which you 
promised to send to me. You also advised me last week that you 
thought your client was claiming a default in some, but not all, 
payments for a period of time since last November. Further, you 
advised me that your client thought that no loss-payee insurance 
policy had ever been issued to him under the contract. You told me 
that you would call me back after you had verified this 
information, but could not get back in touch with me until Monday, 
June 3, 1991. 
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You then called me on Monday and advised me that you have 
lost your file on this matter and do not have a copy of the notice 
of default. You also advised me that your client was claiming that 
no payments have been made since February 1991. 
I have now had an opportunity to discuss your client' s 
claims with mine and it is apparent that there has been some 
misunderstanding. When my client purchased the property, the title 
company disbursed February 1991' s payment directly to Mr. 
Strasrypka. We understand that your client is still holding that 
check for some unexplained reason. The next two months payments 
made by my client were made payable to "A. A. Strasrypka." Your 
client called mine and advised that he could not cash the check as 
written, and requested that the check be re-issued to him in his 
name. Your client agreed to return the original check, and 
suggested that the March and April 1991 payments be made at the 
same time as the May 1991 payment. This my client agreed to do, 
and was awaiting a return of the original check payable to " A. A. 
Strasrypka" when it received the notice from your client dated May 
15, 1991 directing that rent payments be made directly to Mr. 
Strasrypka. 
You have now advised me that your client has collected 
the rents from the real property for the month of June, and is 
holding $420.00 in a separate escrow account. It is our position 
that your client has wrongfully collected these rents and that his 
acts may constitute not only a breach of contract, bur wrongful 
interference with contractual relations. 
In order to resolve this dispute, my client has placed a 
stop payment on the original "A. A. Strasrypka" checks, and encloses 
herewith two checks totalling $380. 00, representing the total 
amount due under the contract for March, April, May and June, 1991. 
Your client is instructed to immediately forward the $420. 00 being 
held in escrow to my clients care of this office. 
Furthermore, as we have previously discussed, my client 
informs me that the property is fully insured. Pursuant to Mr. 
Strasrypka's request, my client has instructed its insurance 
company to endorse your client as a loss-payee, and to send Mr. 
Strasrypka notification and a certificate of insurance when that is 
accomplished. The insurance agent has advised that the certificate 
of insurance should be issued by the end of this week, and that the 
change on the endorsement page will take approximately one month. 
It is our position that there is no default under the 
terms of the contract, and that as well as being obligated by the 
covenants thereunder, Westport Funding Co. is entitled to the 
Donald R. Wilson, Esq. 
June 5, 1991 
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benefits of the contract. We do not wish to become embroiled in 
litigation, and hope that this resolves the matter. 
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1 MR. WILSON: I have no further questions, your 
2 Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 
4 Ms. Van Frank? 
5 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
6 BY MS. VAN FRANK: 
7 Q Mr. Strasrypka, it is my understanding that it is 
8 your position that Mrs. Glazier has been late from the very 
9 first payment she ever made to your father, is that 
10 correct? 
11 A That's correct. 
12 Q Your father had the dealing with Mrs. Glazier 
13 when she took over the property; is that correct? 
14 A Yes, I believe so. 
15 Q You didn't have dealings with Mrs. Glazier; is 
16 that correct? 
17 A No. 
18 Q And your knowledge of your father's dealings with 
19 Mrs. Glazier came directly from your father; is that 
20 correct? 
21 A That is correct. 
22 Q You weren't there when the property was sold; is 
23 that correct? 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q And so your only source of getting information 
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1 about whether or not she was late or early or otherwise in 
2 her payments was your father, right? 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q So you have no personal knowledge of whether or 
5 not Mrs. Glazier was late, or early or otherwise in her 
6 payments; is that correct? 
7 A Yes 
8 MR. WILSON: We are going to object to that 
9 because of time frame. The question is improperly framed. 
10 THE COURT: As to this—this is 
11 cross-examination. That will remain. 
12 Q (By Ms. Van Frank) The basis of your personal 
13 knowledge as to whether or not she was early or late, is 
14 your records, that's what you testified to earlier; isn't 
15 that correct? 
16 A Yes. 
17 MS. VAN FRANK: Your Honor, I would move to 
18 publish the original deposition of Alvan J. Strasrypka 
19 taken on December 2, 1992 before a certified court reporter 
20 that is part of this record. 
21 THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Wilson? 
22 MR. WILSON: No, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Motion to publish is granted. 
24 Q (By Ms. Van Frank) Mr. Strasrypka, you have been 
25 given a copy. You have been given the original of your 
40 
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1 deposition that was taken in this action last December. I 
2 would ask you to turn to page 32 of that deposition. Have 
3 you found that page? 
4 A Yes, I have. 
5 Q On page 2 on page 32—excuse me. At line 2 on 
6 page 32 I have asked you the question, "Have you found any 
7 bank records of your own to reconstruct payment dates from 
8 Mrs. Glazier?" and your response was, no, you hadn't found 
9 any payments or any records of your own. And then I asked 
10 you if you found any bank records of your father's, and 
11 your answer was, no, these checks were cashed immediately. 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q You have no records—you have no records. You 
14 have only the checks that you recall receiving on the first 
15 of the month for more than ten years; isn't that correct? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Your Honor, I would move to strike this witness's 
18 testimony as to whether or not this payment was late. He 
19 has no foundation for it other than what his father told 
20 him. He has no records. He has only his father's hearsay 
21 and his father's hearsay testimony is not admissible at 
22 this time, so I would move to strike this witness's 
23 testimony as to whether or not Mrs. Glazier's payments were 
24 late or early or otherwise. 




1 on the first. The two times we talked to her we would tell 
2 her this and she would— 
3 Q Don't tell me what she said. 
4 A She would tell us. We would tell her the payment 
5 was late and she would always make the statement she could 
6 not pay until the first of the month. 
7 Q You don't have any papers or anything that says 
8 that the first payment she ever made to A. A. Strasrypka 
9 was late; do you know? 
10 A No, I do not. 
11 Q There is nothing in your paper or your 
12 father-in-law's paper that would lead you to believe that 
13 payment was late; is that correct? 
14 A No papers, no. 
15 Q So that's the only thing that lead you to believe 
16 that the payment was coming toward the first of the month; 
17 isn't that correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 MS. VAN FRANK: I have no further questions. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Van Frank. 
21 Any redirect, Mr. Wilson? 
22 MR. WILSON: No, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank 
24 you, ma'am. 
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
. (a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or posses-
sion of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made 
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the 
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by deliver-
ing a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no 
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a 
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or 
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if 
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. 
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be 
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney 
practicing in any of the courts of this state. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are un-
usually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and re-
plies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-
claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order 
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own 
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, re-
quests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on 
order of the court or for use in the proceeding. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with 
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed 
with him, in which event he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith 
transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any. 
APPENDIX XIII 
Rule 36 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 90 
exclude the examiner's testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such 
other order as is authorized under Rule 37. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 35(a) 
has been amended to correspond to Rule 35(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See 
notes of Federal Advisory Committee on Civil 
Procedure 1991 Amendment.) All changes in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) are technical changes to 
correspond with the amendment to paragraph 
(a). In the order establishing the conditions of 
the examination pursuant to paragraph (a), 
the court may also, for good cause shown, order 
that the examination be recorded or that a rep-
resentative of the party or person to be exam-
ined be allowed to attend the examination. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1993, substituted "the 
party or person" for "the party" in Subdivision 
(a); substituted "suitably licensed or certified 
examiner" for "physician" in Subdivision (a) 
and made related changes throughout the rule; 
substituted "the party" for 'lie" and "him" and 
"the party's" for "his" throughout the rule; sub-
stituted "the person examined and/or the other 
party" for "him" in the first sentence in Subdi-
vision (b)(1); substituted "any other examiner" 
for "an examining physician" in Subdivision 
(b)(3); and made stylistic changes throughout 
the rule. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 35(a) and (b), F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Examination of victim. 
Order discretionary. 
Examination of victim. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it refused to allow an independent evaluation 
of the victim at defendant's trial for sexual 
abuse of a child, as defendant accomplished his 
goal of discrediting one expert witness's testi-
mony through the testimony of another expert. 
State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Order discretionary. 
Court's refusal, in custody hearing, to order 
former wife to have psychiatric examination 
was affirmed on basis that rule is discretionary 
rather than mandatory and because of absence 
of sufficient evidence that examination was 
necessary. Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 
P.2d 802 (1967). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery § 282 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 27 CJ.S. Discovery § 37. 
A.L.R. — Waiver of privilege as regards one 
physician as a waiver as to other physicians, 5 
A.L.R.3d 1244. 
Right of party to have his attorney or physi-
cian present during his physical or mental ex-
amination by court appointed expert, 7 
A.L.R.3d 881. 
Timeliness of application for compulsory 
physical examination of injured party in per-
sonal injury action, 9 A.L.R.3d 1146. 
Commencing action involving physical con-
dition of plaintiff or decedent as waiving physi-
cian-patient privilege as to discovery, 21 
A.L.R.3d 912. 
Pretrial testimony or disclosure on discovery 
by party to personal injury action as to nature 
of injuries or treatment as waiver of physician-
patient privilege, 25 A.L.R.3d 1401. 
Assertion of privilege in pretrial discovery 
proceedings as precluding waiver of privilege 
at trial, 36 A.L.R.3d 1367. 
Necessity or permissibility of mental exami-
nation to determine competency or credibility 
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution, 
45 A.L.R.4th 310. 
Right of party to have attorney or physician 
present during physical or mental examination 
at instance of opposing party, 84 A.L.R.4th 
558. 
Key Numbers. — Discovery «=» 78. 
Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a 
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of 
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request 
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, 
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The 
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the 
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admit-
ted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of 
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are 
otherwise furnish &A ™r mo A a * : i ~ i ~ i -
j Each matter of which an admission is requested snan oe 
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the 
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by 
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defen-
dant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration 
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection 
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically 
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party 
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the 
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admis-
sion is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny 
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or 
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtain-
able by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a 
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth 
reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the 
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an 
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court 
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition 
of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to 
trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred 
in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclu-
sively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amend-
ment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amend-
ment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment 
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that with-
drawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the 
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any 
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1986 Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
amendment to this rule varies from the present to Rule 36, F.R.C.P. 
rule and the federal rule in that it requires the Cross-References. — Procedure for service, 
request for admission to advise the party on Rule 4-502, Rules of Judicial Administration, 
whom the request is made of the consequences Service of summons and complaint, U.R.C.P. 
of failure to respond, i.e., that the matter will 4. 
be deemed admitted for the purposes of the 
pending action. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Objectionable matter. 
Effect of admissions. —Prison inmate. 
—Affidavit contradicting admissions. —Reasonable excuse. 
—Introducing admissions into evidence. Implicit motion to withdraw. 
—Offer of proof contrary to admission. Matter of law. 
—Relief from judgment. Motion to dismiss. 
w~:i««« frt ^crvmH —Tolling. 
